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Abstract 
This paper presents the results of economic experiments run among fishermen from the Mexican 
and Colombian Pacific. The experimental design aims at studying behavior under uncertainty 
concerning the possible effects of climate change on fisheries. We find that subjects’ risk-aversion 
diminishes the level of catches and changes fishing practices (e.g. adopting marine reserves), 
provided that fishermen have ex ante information on possible climatic consequences. 
Furthermore, social preferences (e.g. for cooperation and reciprocity) also play an important role 
regarding extraction from common-pool resources. Other factors, such as income, gender and 
religion are also found to have some influence. These results have important implications for 
adaptation actions and the management of coastal fisheries. 
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Social preferences (e.g. cooperation and reciprocity) also play an important role regarding 
extraction from common-pool resources. 
Results have important implications for adaptation actions and the management of coastal 
fisheries. 
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
Economic behavior of fishers under climate-related uncertainty: results from field 
experiments in Mexico and Colombia  
 
Abstract 
This paper presents the results of economic experiments run among fishermen from the Mexican 
and Colombian Pacific. The experimental design aims at studying behavior under uncertainty 
concerning the possible effects of climate change on fisheries. We find that subjects’ risk-aversion 
diminishes the level of catches and changes fishing practices (e.g. adopting marine reserves), 
provided that fishermen have ex ante information on possible climatic consequences. 
Furthermore, social preferences (e.g. for cooperation and reciprocity) also play an important role 
regarding extraction from common-pool resources. Other factors, such as income, gender and 
religion are also found to have some influence. These results have important implications for 
adaptation actions and the management of coastal fisheries. 
 
1. Introduction 
The livelihoods and regional development of millions of people in developing countries depend 
to a large extent on the fishing sector. For example, several Asian and Latin American countries 
are among the major fishing nations in the world and their populations receive up to 20% of 
their protein intake from fish products (FAO, 2012). Furthermore fisheries and aquaculture 
assure the livelihoods of 10-12 percent of the world's population (FAO, 2014). Nevertheless, 
although global fish catch has stabilized during the last decades, fish stocks have been depleted 
in a number of regions worldwide (Worm et al., 2006). A direct consequence of this situation is 
the risk on food security in a number of regions in the developing world (Smith et al., 2011; 
Srinivasan et al., 2010).  
 
A changing climate is an additional factor of risk for a number of fisheries, especially for 
livelihoods in poorer regions (Badjeck et al., 2010). Furthermore, it is well acknowledged that 
the vulnerability of fishing livelihoods toward climate change impacts will be enhanced by poor 
fishery management (Brander, 2007; Allison et al., 2009; McIlgorm et al., 2010). 
 
Thus, understanding stakeholders’ decisions under these risky scenarios is of paramount 
importance for adaptation to climate change (Gowdy, 2008). Experimental economics provides 
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

a powerful tool for analyzing stakeholders behavior when dealing with common-pool resources 
(Cardenas and Ostrom, 2004) and with risky and uncertain situations in general (Sabater-
Grande and Georgantzis, 2002; McAllister et al., 2011; Hasson et al., 2012).  
 
Decisions in fisheries, such as the level of harvesting, or whether or not to comply with 
regulations, depend on a number of factors, chiefly fishermen’s preferences. Among the 
preferences which are relevant in fishing decisions, fishermen’s attitudes toward risks entailed in 
climate hazards play a major role in their actual behavior(Smith & Wilen 2005; Eggert & Lokina 
2007; Nguyen & Leung 2009; Brick et al. 2011).Furthermore, fisheries, is a typical common-pool 
resource extraction activity. In such a context, fishers face the dilemma of individual against 
collective benefits. Experimental economics has proven to be a useful tool to analyze decision-
makers’ risk attitudes and other-regarding preferences in the laboratory or in the field. Then, 
attitudes elicited in an experiment reflect home-grown values which have been developed during 
a subject’s social or professional interaction experiences. Therefore, experimental methods can 
be used to capture attitudes and preferences which both affect and are affected by the subject’s 
real world activity. In this sense, the experiments with populations of fishermen will capture how 
this specific subject pool will behave in a simulated context resembling their real-life decision-
making environment and, consequently, real-world fishery management (Moreno-Sanchez & 
Maldonado 2009; Revollo & Ibarra 2014; Revollo et al. 2016). 
 
In spite of the regional importance of the fisheries sector in Latin America (Thorpe and Bennett, 
2001), few studies in Latin America have used experimental economics for analyzing fishers’ 
behavior in controlled economic environments (for more detail see Table I). Even fewer 
experimental studies have been carried out on adaptation to climate change (e.g. Hasson et al., 
2010; Hasson et al., 2012). In the case of Latin America, Bernal et al. (2013) analyzed the 
adaptation strategies of farmers when confronted to water scarcity due to climate change. 
Although game theory has been used for studying fisheries and climate change (Bailey et al., 
2010), as far as we know, no studies have been published on fisheries’ adaptation to climate 
change using experimental methodology. The aim of this paper is to report results from field 
experiments on behavior toward climate change among fishermen. We present two studies in 
Latin America: one deals with the artisanal fisheries of Tribugá Gulf, Colombia; and the other 
deals with the abalone fishery, off Baja Peninsula, Mexico. We present both cases in detail in 


the next two sections. In both experiments, real monetary rewards were used to incentivize 
the decisions made by subjects in a controlled economic environment. In both experiments, 
the decision-making context involves extraction decisions from a common-pool resource under 
scenarios of external environmental change, framed as a risk affecting the returns of the 
extraction process. This paper is divided into five sections: the introduction is followed by 
materials and methods, results, discussion, and conclusions. 
 
Table I. Summary of field experiments with fisheries in Latin America 
 
2.Methods 
2.1.Local context and study areas 
2.1.1.The abalone fishery off Natividad Island, Baja Peninsula, Mexico 
The abalone fishery off Baja, is one of the most valued fisheries in Mexico (25th place). In 2012, 
the value of a ton was almost 13,000 USD (CONAPESCA, 2012). While abalone in Mexico is 
mostly an export commodity, it indirectly contributes to domestic welfare and food security, 
since earned money is used to buy local food. It is exploited by 22 fishing cooperatives and 
generates about 20,000 jobs (both direct and indirect). Abalone catches have diminished to 
about 10% of the average volume harvested during the 1950s (Revollo and Saenz-Arroyo, 2012). 
Possible explanations for this sharp decrease are: over-exploitation, environmental changes, 
illegal harvesting, or a combination of these. The fact is that global climatic change is expected 
to have more impact on vulnerable fisheries. Indeed, ocean acidification will directly affect 
species with calcium carbonate skeletons (Perry, 2011), such as abalone. Furthermore, there is 
evidence that an increasing temperature and decreasing dissolved oxygen (i.e. hypoxia) in 
coastal ecosystems, due to carbon dioxide absorbed by marine waters (Roessig et al., 2004), 
provokes  higher mortality rates in marine invertebrates such as abalones (e.g. Guzman del Proo 
et al., 2003). 
 
We present the case of the fishing cooperative that operates in Natividad Island 
(27o51´09´´N/115o10´09´´O), located in mid-Baja Peninsula (Figure 1). Both the fishing 
cooperative and the NGO Comunidad y Biodiversidad (COBI A.C.) have implemented a pilot 
program of marine reserves around Natividad Island (Micheli et al., 2012). Under this context, 
we designed a field experiment with the inhabitants of Natividad Island in order to study the 


determinants of their behavior in a harvesting experiment, framed as a common-pool 
resource in the presence of a changing climate. 
 
Figure 1. Natividad Island, Baja Peninsula, Mexico 
 
2.1.2.The Tribugá Gulf fishery, Colombia 
The Tribugá Gulf is located in the northernmost Colombian Pacific, Province of Chocó 
(N5°30’06’’/W77°16’09’’), dominated by a tropical rain forest climate, with 28°C mean 
annual temperature (Figure 2). The Tribugá Gulf fishery sector is characterized by artisanal 
fisheries that mainly use longlines (hooks) and fishing nets. The target species are snapper, 
Pacific sierra, seashells (locally known as “piangua”) and prawns. In this area, artisanal fishing is 
the main livelihood for most coastal communities, but in recent years fish stocks have been 
declining in both capture volume and catch size. Caicedo et al. (2008) reckon that the increase 
in fishing effort, the use of unconventional fishing practices and climate change effects are 
among the main causes of this decline. 
 
In this case, the livelihoods of coastal communities are vulnerable to climate change effects due 
to the lack of proper fisheries management, lack of both basic services (electricity, water, 
sewage) and social security, as well as geographical isolation from the rest of the country. Such a 
situation leads to a poverty trap, as demonstrated by Rebellón (2004), using an adapted version 
of the model of Brander and Taylor (1998). It is shown there, that more effort by the families in 
the Colombian Pacific generates higher levels of income by over-fishing. Thus, it is interesting to 
assess the behavior of fishermen under this vulnerability context, looking at possible 
improvements in fishery management in the region. 
 
Lopez et al. (2004), Cardenas (2008), and Moreno and Maldonado (2009) have analyzed the 
behavior of stakeholders in Colombian fisheries by means of experimental economics. We 
present  the  results  of  a  fishing-game-under-uncertainty  experiment,  which  is  adapted  from 
Ostrom et al. (1994), Cardenas and Ostrom (2004) and Sabater-Grande and Georgantzís (2002), 
in order to assess the decision-making of artisanal fishers, under uncertainty caused by 
potentially changing climate conditions in the Gulf of Tribugá. 
 


Figure 2. Tribugá Gulf, Colombia 
 
2.2.Experimental design 
Due to specific contexts and logistics for each case, we adapted experimental designs for each 
site. Thus, econometric methods (see below) somehow differ in both approach and variables. In 
spite of these differences, the main objective of this study remains the same in both cases1. We 
therefore reckon that results, are nevertheless comparable for drawing valid conclusions. 
 
2.2.1.Natividad Island, Mexico 
Field experiments were carried out at Natividad Island, and included both men and women 
older than 16 years. A public invitation was made to the whole population. It was attended by 
37 people (N=37, 26 men and 11 women), who represented approximately 15% of the total 
adult population in the island with an average monthly income of $630 USD. For the baseline 
treatment (BL), all participants played ten rounds. In the first five (rounds 1-5), they had to 
decide on catches from one to ten resource units, knowing that their monetary rewards (in 
accumulated points converted to real currency at the end of the session) would depend on 
individual and group decisions.2 In the setup implemented, Nash equilibrium is achieved by 
harvesting ten units of resource, while the social optimum is obtained with one harvested unit 
per round. Participants are told that the resource recovery rate was 50% for each round. 
 
For the second sub-session, (rounds 6-10), participants were told that the recovery rate would 
change for the rest of the game and that the change would depend on whether a random 
climatic variation (e.g. El Niño Southern Oscillation -ENSO) would be present in that round3. 
Besides, they were told to choose between either implementing a marine reserve or not, 

1 Payoffs tables and experimental protocols were tested in both Mexico and Colombia with pilot experiments. These 
were carried out with both students and fisheries-related colleagues for improving the experimental design before being 
applied in the field. This is a standard guideline in experimental economics which warrants unbiased decision-making 
among players. Please refer to payoffs tables and experimental protocols in the Appendix. 
2 In the Appendix A, we provide details on the experimental economics: decision sheets and the table of scores. 
3 The stochastic component (i.e. treatment on fisheries uncertainty due to climate change effects) was not included in 
the baseline treatment during the first rounds of the experiment (rounds 1-5 in the Mexican experiment) in order to 
have a reference for comparison among treatments. Otherwise, we would not be able to disentangle the effects from 
climate change uncertainty from the “normal” conditions of fishermen’s decision-making.   



according to the scenarios shown in Table II. This decision to implement or not a marine 
reserve is maintained for the remaining rounds and cannot change in subsequent rounds. 
The decision is made before starting round six and held until the end. Participants were then 
asked to form two groups for the rest of the game: one including those choosing a marine 
reserve (N=30) and another including those deciding not to implement the reserve (N=7). The 
last five rounds follow the same logic as the first five: participants’ profits depend on both 
individual and group extractions. Communication among the participants was forbidden, in all 
cases, before, after, or during the harvesting decisions. 
  
Table II. Scenarios shown to participants in the climatic change / marine reserves at Natividad 
Island, Baja Peninsula, Mexico 
 
Payoffs were calculated following Cardenas and Ramos (2006), considering that fisheries 
resources should be considered as common-pool resources, because usually the individual 
interest is in contradiction of the collective interest. Hence, subject i’s earnings in round t are 
given by: 
 
Where: 
Xi  is harvesting level of participant i whose values range from one to ten and Price denotes 
the price of the common-pool resource. N is the number of participants in each group and 
Recovery Rate is the rate at which the remaining fish stock can regenerate at the end of each 
harvesting period. This depends on the scenario, as shown on Table II. Max Quantity is the 
maximum level of fish stock that is recovered in each round and the sum of all extraction levels, 
Xi correspond to the fish stock level actually harvested at the end of each round. 
 
It  is  worth  noting  that  a  subject’s payoff  increases  in  own  individual  extraction  but 
decreases in the total amount harvested, indicating the existence of horizontal externality 
among individual decision-makers in the extraction game. In other words, the benefits of each 
participant depend on both individual and group extractions (Ostrom et al., 1994). Hence, the 
collective benefits are assumed to be the asset value of the natural resource (i.e. the value of a 
fish left alive in the sea). 


2.2.2.Tribugá Gulf, Colombia 
Before explaining the experimental design applied in the Gulf of Tribugá, Colombia, is important 
to note that this design is different from that applied in Natividad Island (Mexico), due to 
differences in fisheries management in both areas and the type of fishing practices. Natividad 
Island (Mexico), abalone fishing (deep sea fishing) is performed, whose average prices 
generated a high level of income for fishermen in the area and therefore there fishing 
cooperatives that manage a vigorous productive and industrial infrastructure, including support 
research laboratories aquaculture. Instead, in the Gulf of Tribugá (Colombia), shrimp, prawns, 
snapper or Sierra (net and hook fishing) is performed, the average price does not allow the 
angler to reach the minimum level of monthly income to survive, situation which does not 
facilitate fisheries management in the area. 
 
Field experiments were carried out in Nuquí, Coquí, Panguí, Joví, Arusí, Termales, El Valle, 
Jurubirá and Tribugá, coastal communities in the Tribugá Gulf, Province of Chocó, Colombia, 
including both men and women older than 16 years. A public invitation was made to the whole 
population. It was attended by 160 people (142 men and 18 women), who represented 
approximately 8% of the total adult population in the Gulf, with an average monthly income of 
$220 USD. We formed groups of five people and all groups were administered the same 
experiment with the same treatments. Before starting, an explanation of the game context, its 
rules, and monetary retributions were explained to all participants.4 They were told that their 
individual earnings (in accumulated point convertible in real currency at the end of the session) 
would depend on both their individual and group decisions. 
 
They made decisions for 20 rounds of which the first ten (rounds 1-10) corresponded to the 
baseline treatment. For the last ten rounds (rounds 11-20), participants were informed that the 
recovery rate would change for the rest of the session, depending on  the occurrence of a 
random climatic variation (e.g. El Niño Southern Oscillation -ENSO). Besides, they were asked to 
choose between either implementing a marine reserve or not5. Thus, within each group, each 

4 In Appendix B, we provide details on the experimental economics: decision sheets and the table of scores. 
5 The stochastic component (i.e. treatment on fisheries uncertainty due to climate change effects) was not included in 
the baseline treatment during the first rounds of the experiment (rounds 1-10 in the Colombian experiment) in order to 


player must choose, individually and confidentially, whether to play 11-20 rounds under an 
insurance (i.e. with a marine reserve) or not (i.e. open-access fishing without marine reserve). 
The last 10 rounds follow the same logic of the baseline treatment, and the level of earnings 
depends still on both individual and group extractions. Furthermore, two more treatments were 
implemented during the experiment: 
 
a) Communication treatment (n=80): all five participants within each group can communicate for 
five minutes before rounds 11-20, so they can share their experiences and learn from rounds 1-
10 in order to set up a harvesting strategy for the rest of the game. 
 
b) Voluntary enforcement treatment (n=80): the monitor explains the negative effects of 
overfishing and therefore suggests a minimum level of extraction (one unit) in each round. It is 
also noted that harvesting over this recommended level will be enforced. However, 
participants can vote on whether each player’s harvesting levels should be inspected in each 
round. If the inspection mechanism is voted, participants harvesting above the socially optimal 
unit, are fined with minus 100 points for each additional unit extracted from the common pool. 
Both the experimental designs and hence, the models, presented differences between both 
countries in order to adjust for local and institutional realities.  Thus, the theoretical model for 
the economic experiment applied in Colombia is presented as follows. 
 
Payoffs were calculated following Cárdenas (2010)6, with a model that simulates the social 
dilemma of Common Pool Resource (CPR) Hence, the individual harvesting level that maximizes 
the private benefit of each participant (xi); in other words, the agent's objective function is 
defined by his own effort xi, and aggregate efforts by other agents, єxj. Formally, the private 
profit Yi of the agent is given by the expression: 
Y i axi   bxi
 ne xj
j 
N

  

have a reference for comparison among treatments. Otherwise, we would not be able to disentangle the effects from 
climate change uncertainty from the “normal” conditions of fishermen’s decision-making. 
6 The theoretical model implemented is adapted from Cardenas (2010) and extensively described in Georgantzis et al. 
(2013). 


where, a is the income from each harvested unit,  b is the  decreasing marginal parameter , ʔ is 
the externality cost due to stock depletion and n is the number of players M represents the cost 
that each agent i incurs due to the externality emerging from the aggregate extraction by all 
other agents. The Nash solution obtained is given by: 
 
Cárdenas (2010) suggests that a=60, b=5, ʔ = 20 and that the minimum harvesting quantity = 1. 
It follows that in the Nash equilibrium,  
 
Thus, a player maximizing own profits, and taking others’ individual extraction levels as given, 
harvests eight units in each round. For this reason, this model, as suggested Ostrom, Garner and 
Walker (1994), shows that this situation will result in a social dilemma associated with over-
exploitation of CPR. In order to incorporate the possibility of adopting a marine reserve insurance 
against climate change, we follow Sabater-Grande and Georgantzis (2002) and Georgantzís et al. 
(2009). It is important to note that this is a type of economic experiment, which studies the 
behavior of fishers (Tribugá Gulf, Colombia) confronted to risky economic decisions. For this 
reason, the experiment implements a design where fishermen can decide whether or not get 
assurance7 against unexpected events (e.g. climatic change) that possibly, affects fisheries and 
consequently social welfare.  
 
Following this approach, in rounds 11-20 players are faced with a lottery (q, X) giving a payoff X 
with a probability q. The scheme is designed to compensate the risk of obtaining X=0 (with a 
probability of 1-q) with a risk premium which is an increasing (linear) function of the probability 
of the unfavorable outcome, as implied in:  
 
 
The experiment assumes a continuum of lotteries (c, r), that for the fishing game under 
uncertainty is represented by a continuum of Nash Equilibria, compensating riskier options with 
an increase in the expected payoff; in other words, if the player decides not to buy the insurance 

 The assurance is associated with the meaning of a protected area or marine reserve thanks to the 
application of economic experiments in Colombia, 2015: http://www.eltiempo.com/estilo-de-
vida/ciencia/nueva-area-marina-golfo-de-tribuga-cabo-corrientes/15474539


and fishing is adversely affected by climate change, the expected payoff for the player will be low 
or even negative. In summary, the experiment shows that fishermen may have negative payments 
if their decision was not to get insurance (i.e. a protected marine reserve) in the presence of 
unexpected events (i.e. climate variations) that affect fishing. This experimental design is 
consistent with the suggestion by Micheli F, Saenz-Arroyo A, Greenley A, Vazquez L, Espinoza 
Montes JA, Rossetto M, et al. (2012), who successfully demonstrate that under future scenarios of 
frequent and/or persistent disturbance, increasing resilience to climatic impacts through 
networks of marine reserves may be the most effective tool that local communities and nations 
worldwide have to combat the negative impacts of global climate change on marine ecosystems 
and livelihoods. 
 
3. Results 
3.1.Natividad Island, Baja Peninsula, Mexico 
In the first stage (baseline treatment) of the experiment, the average catch was 4.6 units of the 
resource. In the second stage, where a treatment is applied under climate change uncertainty, 
the average catches decrease (3.3 units). Interestingly, when analyzing the evolution of the 
average catches before and after the implementation of marine reserves, along with the 
presence of the hypoxia phenomenon, it is observed that the level of catches for the whole group 
(both with and without reserves), is reduced in about 38%. In contrast, when the experiment 
treatment change, the group without marine reserves reduced their harvesting level in 20% (p-
value<0.01), while the group with marine reserves reduced catches in 46% (p-value<0.01). Hence, 
both groups, after learning the possibility of a climatic event, decided to reduced their average 
catch (Figure 3).  
 
About 75% of participants decided to implement a marine reserve during the second stage of the 
experiment. Besides, when asked the percentage that they would devote to creating marine 
reserve with or without a scenario of climatic variability (i.e. hypoxia), they responded that a 41-
50% of the fishing ground would be converted into marine reserve in the presence of hypoxic 
conditions, and 21-30% otherwise. 
 
Figure 3. Average harvesting levels for the baseline (left panel) and climatic variability (right 
panel) treatments (p-value < 0.01). ANOVA to test whether the normality and hetersokedasticity 


assumptions are accepted. It is verified that harvesting levels are significantly different across 
treatments.  
 
3.2.The Tribugá Gulf, Colombia 
The results show that the average extraction for 11-20 rounds (control treatments 
communication and voluntary-enforcement) in context of climate change uncertainty, are always 
lower compared to those obtained in rounds 1-10 (baseline). Particularly, the results show an 
average decrease from 4.55 extraction units (baseline treatment) to 3.55 units under the 
communication treatment, and an even further decrease to 2.55 units under the voluntary-
enforcement treatment (Figure 4) (p-value<0.05).  
 
The results suggest that the average extraction decisions of fishermen, who participated in the 
common-pool resource game, are clearly influenced by the treatments as evidenced by 
Cardenas et al. (2002), Cardenas et al. (2003), Cardenas and Ostrom (2004), Cardenas (2010), 
Lopez et al. (2009), Maldonado and Moreno (2010), Ostrom et al. (1994), Ostrom (2005) and 
Velez et al. (2008).  
 
In other words, to interpret the behavior of participants during 11-20 rounds, under the 
inclusion of treatments (communication and regulation) and the possibility that fishing is 
affected by unexpected events, such presence of natural changes (water heating, migration of 
species, seasonality of the resource), or defection in commitments set by the community, the 
results show that the extraction levels fall.   
 
Additionally, most participants (152 out of 160) chose to adopt a marine reserve as insurance 
against uncertain climatic variation in each round (rounds 11-20).  
 
Figure 4. Average harvesting levels for the baseline (left panel), communication and voluntary-
enforcement (right panel) treatments (p-value < 0.05). ANOVA to test whether the normality and 
heterocedasticity assumptions are accepted. It is verified that harvesting levels are significantly 
different across treatments.  
 
 


3.3. Econometric estimation 
3.3.1.Natividad Island8 
An econometric model was applied for assessing the socioeconomic and social capital 
variables that influence decisions on common-pool resources and climatic variability among 
islanders at Natividad Island. Table III shows the variables introduced in our model. The model 
takes the form: 
 
 
 
The dependent variable is harvesting level in the reference period, while all other independent 
variables are introduced with a lag, assuming that what is decided in a given period depends on 
strategies and feedback from past rounds, except climatic variations. 
 
Table III. Variables introduced in the econometric model 
 
Table IV shows the results of the econometric estimation. Among the statistically significant 
variables (p<0.1), the ones that measure the harvesting behavior of participant i (CATCHI) and 
participant j (CATCHJ) reveal that, for each fish stock unit away from the social optimum in 
the previous round, participant i will harvest about 0.53 additional units of the resource stock. 
Furthermore, for every unit extracted by other players away from the social optimum, 
participant i will harvest 0.48 units in the next round. Another significant variable was GENDER, 
indicating that women’s extractions are 0.70 units lower than men’s. Besides, changing 
treatment from a baseline to a random climatic event (TREAT) in the following round, leads to 
reductions of 0.44 fish stock units under a marine reserve treatment, while this reduction is of 

8 We applied a balanced panel data model since we had both cross-section information (i.e. harvesting levels of 
participants in each round) and a time series (ten rounds). After comparing the estimates of two panel- data methods 
(fixed and random effects) and with the results of a Hausmman test, we decided to use a random-effects panel-data 
model. We decided to use a random-effects model since it included variables that do not change within individuals, 
but that do change among individuals. Breusch-Pagan, Hausman and F-tests were performed. Besides, auto-correlation 
and heterocedasticity tests were used in order to choose the best model specification (for more detail see: Revollo, 
2012). 


0.22 without a marine reserve. The possibility of climatic variations (CLIMATE) induced 
participants to lower their extraction in 0.24 of resource units. 
 
Table IV. Econometric estimations for explaining the individual harvesting decisions (CATCH) of 
participants in the Natividad Island experiment 
 
3.3.2.Tribugá Gulf, Colombia9 
An econometric model was applied for assessing the decision-making of artisanal fishers, under 
uncertainty caused by potential climate change conditions in the Gulf of Tribugá. Table V shows 
the variables introduced in our model. The model takes the form: 
 
 
 
Table V. Variables introduced in the econometric model 
 
Table VI shows the results of the econometric estimation. So, for the variable EXPERIENCE, it 
suggests that more years of fishing experience do not necessarily lead to decreases in the levels 
of extraction by the fisher (p-value<0.01). Hence, the average behavior of fishermen 
remains invariant to their experience. Furthermore, the negative sign of the SCHOOL variable 
indicates that a higher education level implies a greater commitment to sustainable fishing 
decisions (p-value<0.01). With respect to income, the result suggests that for every percentage 
point increase in the level of income resulting from fishing activities, extraction decisions are 
increased by 5.7% (p-value<0.01). AGE was not statistically significant. 
 

9 Like in the empirical evidence of Natividad Island, we applied a balanced panel data model since we had both cross-
section information (i.e. harvesting levels of participants in each round) and a time series (twenty rounds). After 
comparing the estimates of two panel-data methods (fixed and random effects) and with the results of a Hausmman 
test, we decided to use a random-effects panel-data model. We decided to use a random-effects model since it 
included variables that do not change within individuals, but that do change among individuals. Furthermore, 
following the recommendations of Baltagi (2008) and Hsiao (2003), the estimates are correct, as there is no 
autocorrelation, nor hetersokedasticity (for more detail see: Arroyo, 2013).  


Now, consider the change in the second part of the session with respect to baseline, introducing 
uncertainty in the decision-making context and two treatments (communication and 
enforcement), this then affects the levels of captures in rounds 11-20. In fact, the fishermen 
reduce their levels of catch by 0.08 of common-pool resource units. Particularly, as explained 
above, there is a clear effect of communication and enforcement on catch decisions. 
 
Table VI. Econometric estimations for explaining the individual harvesting decisions (CATCH) of 
participants in the Tribugá Gulf experiment 
 
4. Discussion 
We provide evidence of behavior in controlled environments by Mexican and Colombian fishing 
communities under a scenario of climatic variability. In the case of Mexico, the average 
extraction decrease from the baseline treatment to the climate change treatment was 46%; 
while in Colombia the decrease ranged between 22% (communication treatment) to 44% 
(voluntary-enforcement treatment). These results could be explained under the light of 
three types of factors: the subjects’ aversion towards an external risky influence (i.e. climate 
change), social preferences (e.g. cooperation and reciprocity), and other demographic elements 
(e.g. income, gender and religion). 
 
4.1.Climate-related risk aversion 
When confronted with a treatment where harvesting levels depended on a climatic influence 
in the second stage of the experiments, most participants in both countries (95% in Colombia 
and about 83% in Mexico) decided to adopt an insurance against climatic risks, in the form of a 
marine reserve. Such a scenario implies that fishers would be willing to change fishing practices 
in order to secure a less risky flow of future income. These results suggest that information 
on climatic variability inhibits common-pool resource over-exploitation. In  this  case,  fishers  
would  adopt  sustainable  fishing  practices,  like  lowering their  extractions towards a social 
optimum or implementing marine reserves before a climate change scenario, not necessarily 
because of pro-environmental preferences, but in order to minimize their expected disutility. 
This is a standard result as fishermen frequently are confronted with decision-making in the 
presence of uncertainty (Smith and Wilen, 2005; Eggert and Lokina, 2007; Nguyen and Leung, 
2009). 


Adaptation to climate variability in fisheries could be helped by information on the risks of 
climate change in fishing productivity and therefore in their future livelihoods. Furthermore, 
adaptation actions could include the encouragement for implementing marine reserves among 
coastal communities. In fact, Micheli et al. (2012) have demonstrated that marine reserves 
enhance resilience under climatic variability, acting as an ecological insurance against climate 
change. This is important because, to date, no specific actions or programs are aimed at 
adapting the Mexican fishery sector to climate change impacts (Ibarra et al., 2013). Similar 
situations can be found elsewhere in Latin America, including Colombia. 
 
Now, as in the experiment, fishermen face certain types of uncertainty for decisions that ignore 
other fishermen. For this reason, each participant had to privately decide whether  she  would  
overharvest  and  how  many  additional  units  she  would overharvest  as  it happens in usual 
fisheries operations (Gelcich et al., 2013). Finally, as pointed out by Gelchich et al. (2013), an 
additional source of uncertainty faced by each fisherman, both in the experiment and in the real 
world, is due to the horizontal externality emerging from the extraction decisions of other 
fishermen. 
 
4.2. Social preferences 
Apart from the subject’s attitude towards the risk of climate change, social preferences are also 
important in determining participants’ behavior. Indeed, when managing common-pool 
resources, such as fisheries, it is always useful to remind that the willingness to cooperate of one 
agent will depend on the behavior of other agents (Keser and Van Winden, 2000). In fact, 
Cardenas and Ostrom (2004) point out that the empirical evidence of experimental economics 
on common- pool   resources,   show   that   groups   who   can   effectively   communicate   (i.e. 
possibility of cooperation), establish a set of social norms, reducing, consequently, over-
exploitation. 
 
In our experiments, we found that participants presented a more sustainable behavior in 
common-pool resources extraction after participating in the baseline treatment. This result can 
be explained also by a certain degree of cooperation, trust, and reciprocity. According to Fehr 
and Leibbrandt (2011), cooperation and low impatience are drivers for such a behavior. 
Moreover, social preferences such as altruism and cooperation might enhance productivity 


(Carpenter and Seki, 2011), but in contrast, competition may lead to lower cooperation 
(Carpenter and Seki 2006; Stoop et al. 2010). In the experiment carried out in Natividad Island, 
the fact that variables CATCHI (difference between social optimum harvest and the participant’s 
i actual harvest in the previous round. In other words, it measures the willingness to cooperate 
of participant i) and CATCHJ ( difference between social optimum harvest and the participant’s j 
actual harvest in the previous round. It measures the willingness to cooperate of the rest of 
participants) were statistically significant, implies that cooperation was an important factor in 
determining the harvesting levels. In this way, a participant conditioned her catch to the 
harvesting level of the rest of the group. 
 
Trust and reciprocity were, therefore, other important factors among participants’ behavior. The 
importance of trust has been highlighted by McAllister et al. (2011), who found that, under a 
risky treatment, trust depended on reciprocity, that is to say, participants reckoned that it was 
riskier not to reciprocate among trusting individuals than in a do-nothing treatment. Revollo and 
Ibarra (2013) found in a common-pool resource lab experiment among Mexican students, that 
players showed a certain degree of reciprocal punishment (i.e. higher harvesting levels) if 
they noticed that the rest of the group did not cooperate on resource conservation. In fact, 
Kraak (2011) reviewed the evidence that reciprocity is an important factor to fishermen in non-
anonymous treatments for more sustainable practices. 
 
Important considerations for fisheries management can be drawn from our results, given the 
fact that  real-world  stakeholders  showed  reciprocity  and  willingness  to  cooperate  (Gowdy,  
2008; Venkatachalam, 2008). Indeed, the success of external (i.e. governmental) regulations 
depends on the existence of informal rules or local ecological knowledge among stakeholders. 
For example, Velez et al. (2008) argue that external regulation should complement existing 
informal regulations for fisheries management in Colombia. A similar result was found by Vollan 
et al. (2013) for Namibian and South African rural herders. Such results suggest that co-
management regimes should be seriously considered for managing common-pool resources, 
such as fisheries. Indeed, Moreno-Sanchez and Maldonado (2009) found that experiments under 
a co-management treatment showed more sustainable harvesting levels in a marine protected 
area off Colombia. In fact, co-management could offer effective sustainability results when 


dealing with small-scale fisheries, as demonstrated by Defeo and Castilla (2005) for several Latin 
American examples. 
 
4.3.Other factors 
Other factors explaining fisher’s decisions on lowering their harvest after the baseline treatment 
were income and religion in the Colombian experiment, and gender in both cases. First, income 
is a standard result in experimental economics. Second, in the Tribugá Gulf study, although the 
number  of  male  participants  outnumbered  those of  women  (12%)  the  GENDER  variable  
was statistically significant. This result was also observed in Natividad Island, with a larger 
percent of female participants (29%). Thus, women presented more sustainable catches than 
men. Indeed, there is empirical evidence that women are more risk-averse in general (Eckel and 
Grossman, 2008; Croson and Gneezy, 2009), and have more sustainable attitudes than men 
(Davidson and Black, 2001; Agarwal, 2009; Revollo, 2012). And third, religion was statistically 
significant for the Colombian experiment (this variable was not tested in the Mexican 
experiment) explaining the decrease in harvesting levels. Few studies have demonstrated the 
actual influence of a belief in decision-making towards the environment, but in general, these 
show that it does have a positive influence (Chermak and Krause, 2002; Owen and Videras, 
2007), although in other public-good experiments this relationship was not evident (Anderson 
and Mellor, 2009). 
 
5. Conclusion 
We have studied the behavior of fishermen communities in a controlled experimental harvesting 
environment of common-pool resources. The subjects were familiar with the decision-making 
problem they faced in the experiment. Thus, their reactions to our treatment factors had 
the expected sign. The vast majority would react to climate change through risk-reducing 
mechanisms like a marine reserve or any sort of insurance. Also, depending on their social and 
educational background, learning from past experience leads them to more sustainable 
harvesting levels, avoiding common-pool resource depletion. Climate-related risk-aversion is an 
idiosyncratic behavioral reaction to an external factor leading to lower catches or changes in 
fishing practices (e.g. adopting marine reserves), provided that fishermen have information in 
advance of possible climatic consequences. 
 


We suggest that the results from both experiments support the conclusion that the behavior for 
sustainable fishing is l i k e l y  t o  b e  achieved, if and only if, control mechanisms are 
established to encourage both fisheries management and improvement of life quality to 
inhabitants in both studied areas. For example, as suggested by González, G., Díaz, Y. and 
Puentes, V. (2015), the work done in Tribugá Gulf-Colombia reveals that regulation of less 
selective fishing gear may be a possible alternative in the region, because the tendency is 
towards a drastic reduction in fishing. Either way, the Exclusive Zone for Artisanal Fisheries in 
the Tribugá Gulf, which is the result of a process of community and government participation, 
shows that it is necessary to work on marketing chains for the fishermen for improving their 
income and hence their quality of life. Furthermore, social preferences (e.g. cooperation and 
reciprocity) also played an important role in determining a more sustainable attitude in 
common-pool resources extraction. Other factors, such as income, gender and religion had also 
some influence. 
 
Additionally, it is important to note that in both countries, the results of the experiments were 
complemented by a survey that sought to strengthen governance processes of local communities 
for the collective construction of sustainable fishery agreements. In case of Colombia and Mexico, 
we asked the fishermen if they agreed to implement an area of fisheries reserves, which could be 
either an exclusive artisanal fishing zone, a closed area or an area where responsible fishing is 
carried out. In other words, the question involves the possibilities for fishermen to establish 
agreements for sustainable fisheries.  
 
Finally, this paper presents empirical evidence on the economic behavior of fishermen and their 
behavior on the management of common pool resources, in a context of uncertainty (climate 
events). For this reason, the results of economic experiments applied to fishing groups in Mexico 
and Colombia, concluded on the importance of the implementation of marine reserves. Thus, this 
paper attempts to collaborate and complement the few studies in this field of experimental 
economic methods and climatic phenomena that have developed in developing countries, such as 
Latin America. 
 
 
 


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Table I. Summary of field experiments with fisheries in Latin America 
 
Fishery Region of study Main results Reference 
Artisanal fisheries, 
Clam fisheries, and 
Trout fishery 
Caribbean, south 
Pacific, and Andean 
region, all in Colombia 
Cooperation under a 
low regulation penalty, 
and free-riding under a 
high regulation penalty; 
opposition to externally 
imposed regulations 
(Cardenas 2005) 
Artisanal fisheries 
(lobster, conch, 
snapper) and crab 
hunting 
Providence Island, 
Colombia 
Crab hunters were 
more willing to 
cooperate than fishers 
under tax and 
communication 
treatments. 
(Castillo and Saysel 2005) 
Artisanal fisheries Baru Island, Colombia High harvesting rate 
chosen with varying fish 
stock levels. 
(Cardenas et al. 2008) 
Artisanal fisheries Caribbean coast, the 
Pacific coast and the 
Magdalena river (all in 
Colombia). 
External regulation 
should complement 
existing informal 
regulations. 
(Velez et al. 2008) 
Fish or water 
extraction 
Five villages in 
Colombia 
Absence of 
enforcement 
conditioned the 
compliance of a 
regulation on the 
behavior of others. 
(Rodriguez-Sickert et al. 2008) 
Artisanal fisheries Caribbean coast, 
Colombia. 
Experiments under a 
co-management 
treatment showed 
more sustainable 
(Moreno-Sanchez and Maldonado 
2009) 
7DEOH,
Fishery Region of study Main results Reference 
harvesting levels in a 
marine protected area. 
Artisanal fisheries Caribbean coast, the 
Pacific coast and the 
Magdalena river (all in 
Colombia). 
Altruism, conformity 
and reciprocity 
featured the harvesting 
decisions of fishers. 
(Velez et al. 2009) 
 
Table II. Scenarios shown to participants in the climatic change / marine reserves at Natividad 
Island, Baja, Mexico 
Game stages SCENARIOS 
First round  
(Baseline R:1-5)  
Recovery rate (RR) = 50% 
(Nº = 37) 
Second round 
(Treatment) 
(R: 6-10) 
Marine reserve implementation  
(Nº = 30) 
No marine reserve implementation  
(Nº = 7) 
Climatic variation No climatic variation Climatic variation No climatic variation 
RR = 40%* RR = 60%* RR = 20%* RR = 80%* 
* The recovery rates were chosen according to the information of Guzmán del Proo et al. (2003) who found 
the changes in recruitment (presumably due to a higher level of hypoxia) for marine invertebrates before 
and after the 1997-1998 ENSO event at Bahia Tortugas, Baja peninsula, Mexico. 

7DEOH,,
Table III. Variables introduced in the econometric model 
Variable Description Expected sign 
Dependent 
CATCH Harvesting level of participant i in round t+1   
Independent 
CATCHI 
Difference between social optimum harvest and the participant’s i actual 
harvest in the previous round.  (+,-) 
It measures the willingness to cooperate of participant i. 
CATCHJ 
Difference between social optimum harvest and the participant’s j actual 
harvest in the previous round.  (+,-) 
It measures the willingness to cooperate of the rest of participants. 
POINTS 
Difference in absolute value between the points of participant i and the rest 
of participants in the previous round. (+,-) 
It measures the inequity aversion. 
CLIMATE 
Dichotomous variable for indicating whether (1) or not (0) a climatic event 
takes place in that round. 
(-) 
TREAT 
Count variable for indicating the type of treatment: 1 for the baseline 
treatment, 2 for no marine reserve implemented, and 3 for marine reserve 
implemented. 
(-) 
GENDER 
Dichotomous variable for indicating gender of participant: 1 for man and 0 
for woman. 
(+) 
FISH 
Dichotomous variable for indicating whether (1) or not (0) the participant is 
actually a fisher in real life. 
(-) 
RESERVE 
Count variable for indicating the percent area that the participant would 
implement as marine reserve: 0-10%=1, 11-20%=2, 21-30%=3, 31-40%=4, 
41-50%=5, 51-60%=6, 61-70%=7, 71-80%=8, 81-90%=9, 91-100%=10. 
(-) 

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Table IV. Econometric estimations for explaining the individual harvesting decisions (CATCH) of 
participants in the Natividad Island experiment 

 Coefficient Std. Err. p > |Z| 
CATCHI 0.528 0.078 0.000 * 
CATCHJ 0.481 0.259 0.064 * 
POINTS -0.001 0.001 0.377 
GENDER 0.701 2.03 0.043 * 
TREAT -0.223 0.314 0.077 * 
CLIMATE -0.241 0.446 0.091 * 
RESERVE -0.159 0.126 0.205 
FISH -0.355 0.375 0.344 
CONSTANT 1.917 1.466 0.191 
* p < 0.10    
R-squared = 0.458    
Wald chi2(8) = 146.68 
Prob > chi2 = 0.0000 
N = 333 
   

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Table V. Variables introduced in the econometric model 

Variable                                                                  Description                                                           Expected sign 

Dependent 

CATCH                    Harvesting level of participant i in round t+1 

Independent 
EXPER                    Continuous variable reflecting individual behavior based on years of fishing             (+) 
Categorical variable indicating civil status of participant: 1 for free-union, 2

CIVIL 

for married, 3 for single, 4 for divorced                                                                             (+,-)
INCOME                 Monthly income from fishing activities                                                                             (+) 
SCHOOL                Continuous variable indicating years of formal education                                              (-) 
Categorical variable indicating religion: 1 for Catholic, 2 for Christian

RELIGION 
GENDER 

CLIMATE 
Evangelical or Pentecostal, 3 for agnostic                                                                         (+,-) 
Dichotomous variable for indicating gender of participant: 1 for man and 0 
(+) 
for woman. 

Dichotomous variable for indicating whether (1) or not (0) a climatic event 
(-) 
takes place in that round
7DEOH9

Table VI. Econometric estimations for explaining the individual harvesting decisions 
(CATCH) of participants in the Tribugá Gulf experiment 
                                
                            

 Coefficient Std. Err. p > |Z| 
EXPER 0.0041 0.00127 0.074 * 
SCHOOL -0.2382 0.01844 0.000 
INCOME 0.0568 0.01589 0.000 
AGE 0.0004 0.00131 0.720 
CIVIL 0.1206 0.02366 0.000 
RELIGION 0.4195 0.0542 0.000 
GENDER 0.4212 0.05390 0.000 
CLIMATE -0.07953 0.08907 0.000 
* p < 0.10 
R-squared = 0.445 
Prob > chi2 = 0.000 
N = 1500 
   

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A.1.1. Baseline: Recovery Rate = 50% - Rounds 1-5  
    TABLE OF POINTS (PROFIT EXTRACTION + CONSERVATION) 
    My level of extraction 
    1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Th
e 
le
ve
l o
f e
xt
ra
ct
io
n 
of
 th
em
 
0 
   
1,593  
   
1,685  
   
1,778  
   
1,870  
   
1,963  
   
2,055  
   
2,148  
   
2,240  
   
2,333  
   
2,425  
1 
   
1,585  
   
1,678  
   
1,770  
   
1,863  
   
1,955  
   
2,048  
   
2,140  
   
2,233  
   
2,325  
   
2,418  
2 
   
1,578  
   
1,670  
   
1,763  
   
1,855  
   
1,948  
   
2,040  
   
2,133  
   
2,225  
   
2,318  
   
2,410  …
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
50 
   
1,218  
   
1,310  
   
1,403  
   
1,495  
   
1,588  
   
1,680  
   
1,773  
   
1,865  
   
1,958  
   
2,050  
51 
   
1,210  
   
1,303  
   
1,395  
   
1,488  
   
1,580  
   
1,673  
   
1,765  
   
1,858  
   
1,950  
   
2,043  
52 
   
1,203  
   
1,295  
   
1,388  
   
1,480  
   
1,573  
   
1,665  
   
1,758  
   
1,850  
   
1,943  
   
2,035  …
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
100 
      
843  
      
935  
   
1,028  
   
1,120  
   
1,213  
   
1,305  
   
1,398  
   
1,490  
   
1,583  
   
1,675  
101 
      
835  
      
928  
   
1,020  
   
1,113  
   
1,205  
   
1,298  
   
1,390  
   
1,483  
   
1,575  
   
1,668  
102 
      
828  
      
920  
   
1,013  
   
1,105  
   
1,198  
   
1,290  
   
1,383  
   
1,475  
   
1,568  
   
1,660  …
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
189 
      
175  
      
268  
      
360  
      
453  
      
545  
      
638  
      
730  
      
823  
      
915  
   
1,008  
190 
      
168  
      
260  
      
353  
      
445  
      
538  
      
630  
      
723  
      
815  
      
908  
   
1,000  
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A.1.2.1. Marine Reserve: Recovery Rate = 40% - Rounds 6-10 
    TABLE OF POINTS (PROFIT EXTRACTION + CONSERVATION) 
    My level of extraction 
    1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Th
e 
le
ve
l o
f e
xt
ra
ct
io
n 
of
 th
em
 
0 
   
1,493  
   
1,586  
   
1,679  
   
1,772  
   
1,865  
   
1,958  
   
2,051  
   
2,144  
   
2,237  
   
2,330  
1 
   
1,486  
   
1,579  
   
1,672  
   
1,765  
   
1,858  
   
1,951  
   
2,044  
   
2,137  
   
2,230  
   
2,323  
2 
   
1,479  
   
1,572  
   
1,665  
   
1,758  
   
1,851  
   
1,944  
   
2,037  
   
2,130  
   
2,223  
   
2,316  …
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
50 
   
1,143  
   
1,236  
   
1,329  
   
1,422  
   
1,515  
   
1,608  
   
1,701  
   
1,794  
   
1,887  
   
1,980  
51 
   
1,136  
   
1,229  
   
1,322  
   
1,415  
   
1,508  
   
1,601  
   
1,694  
   
1,787  
   
1,880  
   
1,973  
52 
   
1,129  
   
1,222  
   
1,315  
   
1,408  
   
1,501  
   
1,594  
   
1,687  
   
1,780  
   
1,873  
   
1,966  …
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
100 
      
793  
      
886  
      
979  
   
1,072  
   
1,165  
   
1,258  
   
1,351  
   
1,444  
   
1,537  
   
1,630  
101 
      
786  
      
879  
      
972  
   
1,065  
   
1,158  
   
1,251  
   
1,344  
   
1,437  
   
1,530  
   
1,623  
102 
      
779  
      
872  
      
965  
   
1,058  
   
1,151  
   
1,244  
   
1,337  
   
1,430  
   
1,523  
   
1,616  …
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
189 
      
170  
      
263  
      
356  
      
449  
      
542  
      
635  
      
728  
      
821  
      
914  
   
1,007  
190 
      
163  
      
256  
      
349  
      
442  
      
535  
      
628  
      
721  
      
814  
      
907  
   
1,000  
 
$SSHQGL[$
A.1.2.2. Marine Reserve: Recovery Rate = 60% - Rounds 6-10 
    TABLE OF POINTS (PROFIT EXTRACTION + CONSERVATION) 
    My level of extraction 
    1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Th
e 
le
ve
l o
f e
xt
ra
ct
io
n 
of
 th
em
 
0 
   
1,692  
   
1,784  
   
1,876  
   
1,968  
   
2,060  
   
2,152  
   
2,244  
   
2,336  
   
2,428  
   
2,520  
1 
   
1,684  
   
1,776  
   
1,868  
   
1,960  
   
2,052  
   
2,144  
   
2,236  
   
2,328  
   
2,420  
   
2,512  
2 
   
1,676  
   
1,768  
   
1,860  
   
1,952  
   
2,044  
   
2,136  
   
2,228  
   
2,320  
   
2,412  
   
2,504  …
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
50 
   
1,292  
   
1,384  
   
1,476  
   
1,568  
   
1,660  
   
1,752  
   
1,844  
   
1,936  
   
2,028  
   
2,120  
51 
   
1,284  
   
1,376  
   
1,468  
   
1,560  
   
1,652  
   
1,744  
   
1,836  
   
1,928  
   
2,020  
   
2,112  
52 
   
1,276  
   
1,368  
   
1,460  
   
1,552  
   
1,644  
   
1,736  
   
1,828  
   
1,920  
   
2,012  
   
2,104  …
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
100 
      
892  
      
984  
   
1,076  
   
1,168  
   
1,260  
   
1,352  
   
1,444  
   
1,536  
   
1,628  
   
1,720  
101 
      
884  
      
976  
   
1,068  
   
1,160  
   
1,252  
   
1,344  
   
1,436  
   
1,528  
   
1,620  
   
1,712  
102 
      
876  
      
968  
   
1,060  
   
1,152  
   
1,244  
   
1,336  
   
1,428  
   
1,520  
   
1,612  
   
1,704  …
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
189 
      
180  
      
272  
      
364  
      
456  
      
548  
      
640  
      
732  
      
824  
      
916  
   
1,008  
190 
      
172  
      
264  
      
356  
      
448  
      
540  
      
632  
      
724  
      
816  
      
908  
   
1,000  
 
$SSHQGL[$
A.1.2.3. No Marine Reserve: Recovery Rate = 20% - Rounds 6-10 
    TABLE OF POINTS (PROFIT EXTRACTION + CONSERVATION) 
    My level of extraction 
    1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Th
e 
le
ve
l o
f e
xt
ra
ct
io
n 
of
 th
em
 
0 
   
1,294  
   
1,388  
   
1,482  
   
1,576  
   
1,670  
   
1,764  
   
1,858  
   
1,952  
   
2,046  
   
2,140  
1 
   
1,288  
   
1,382  
   
1,476  
   
1,570  
   
1,664  
   
1,758  
   
1,852  
   
1,946  
   
2,040  
   
2,134  
2 
   
1,282  
   
1,376  
   
1,470  
   
1,564  
   
1,658  
   
1,752  
   
1,846  
   
1,940  
   
2,034  
   
2,128  …
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
50 
      
994  
   
1,088  
   
1,182  
   
1,276  
   
1,370  
   
1,464  
   
1,558  
   
1,652  
   
1,746  
   
1,840  
51 
      
988  
   
1,082  
   
1,176  
   
1,270  
   
1,364  
   
1,458  
   
1,552  
   
1,646  
   
1,740  
   
1,834  
52 
      
982  
   
1,076  
   
1,170  
   
1,264  
   
1,358  
   
1,452  
   
1,546  
   
1,640  
   
1,734  
   
1,828  …
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
100 
      
694  
      
788  
      
882  
      
976  
   
1,070  
   
1,164  
   
1,258  
   
1,352  
   
1,446  
   
1,540  
101 
      
688  
      
782  
      
876  
      
970  
   
1,064  
   
1,158  
   
1,252  
   
1,346  
   
1,440  
   
1,534  
102 
      
682  
      
776  
      
870  
      
964  
   
1,058  
   
1,152  
   
1,246  
   
1,340  
   
1,434  
   
1,528  …
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
189 
      
160  
      
254  
      
348  
      
442  
      
536  
      
630  
      
724  
      
818  
      
912  
   
1,006  
190 
      
154  
      
248  
      
342  
      
436  
      
530  
      
624  
      
718  
      
812  
      
906  
   
1,000  
 
$SSHQGL[$
A.2. Individual Decision Sheet (Baseline and Treatments): Rounds 1-10 
Rounds My nevel the extraction 
The level of 
extraction of them Score 
Practice 1       
Practice 2       
Practice 3       
1       
2       
3       ...       
10       
Total       
 
$SSHQGL[$
B.1. Individual Score Table 
  My own amount of yield 
Aggregated amount 
of other participants 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
4 758 790 818 840 858 870 878 880 
5 738 770 798 820 838 850 858 860 
6 718 750 778 800 818 830 838 840 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 …
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
10 638 670 698 720 738 750 758 760 
11 618 650 678 700 718 730 738 740 
12 598 630 658 680 698 710 718 720 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 …
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
20 438 470 498 520 538 550 558 560 
21 418 450 478 500 518 530 538 540 
22 398 430 458 480 498 510 518 520 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 …
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
30 238 270 298 320 338 350 358 360 
31 218 250 278 300 318 330 338 340 
32 198 230 258 280 298 310 318 320 
 
$SSHQGL[%
B.2. Individual Decision Sheet - Baseline: Rounds 1-10 
Rounds 
A: Individual  
Amount of 
Yield 
B: Aggregated  
Amount of Yield 
of Group  
C (B-A): Aggregated 
Amount of Yield from 
other participants 
D: 
Score 
Practice 1         
Practice 2         
Practice 3         
1         
2         
3         ...         
10         
Total         
 
$SSHQGL[%
B.3.1. Internal Regulation 
Rounds Vote for regulation* 
A: 
Individual  
Amount 
of Yield 
B: 
Aggregated 
Amount of 
Yield of 
Group 
C (B-A): 
Aggregated 
Amount of 
Yield from 
other 
participants 
D: 
Score 
E: 
Regulation 
Fine 
F (D-E): 
Final 
Score 
Fishing under 
unexpected 
conditions 
11 Y N             Y N 
12 Y N             Y N 
13 Y N             Y N 
...                   
20 Y N             Y N 
 
* The regulation applies only when the majority votes YES in the group; i.e. if there are at least 3 for YES votes, 
regulation is applied.   
 
$SSHQGL[%
B.3.2. Random Regulation 
Round
s 
A: 
Individua
l  Amount 
of Yield 
B: 
Aggregate
d Amount 
of Yield of 
Group 
C (B-A): 
Aggegated 
Amount of 
Yield from 
other 
participant
s 
D: 
Score 
E: 
Regulatio
n Fine 
F (D-E): 
Final 
Score 
Fishing under 
unexpected 
conditions 
11             Y N 
12             Y N 
13             Y N ...                 
20             Y N 
 
$SSHQGL[%
A.1.2.4. No Marine Reserve: Recovery Rate = 80% - Rounds 6-10 
    TABLE OF POINTS (PROFIT EXTRACTION + CONSERVATION) 
    My level of extraction 
    1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Th
e 
le
ve
l o
f e
xt
ra
ct
io
n 
of
 th
em
 
0 
   
1,891  
   
1,982  
   
2,073  
   
2,164  
   
2,255  
   
2,346  
   
2,437  
   
2,528  
   
2,619  
   
2,710  
1 
   
1,882  
   
1,973  
   
2,064  
   
2,155  
   
2,246  
   
2,337  
   
2,428  
   
2,519  
   
2,610  
   
2,701  
2 
   
1,873  
   
1,964  
   
2,055  
   
2,146  
   
2,237  
   
2,328  
   
2,419  
   
2,510  
   
2,601  
   
2,692  …
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
50 
   
1,441  
   
1,532  
   
1,623  
   
1,714  
   
1,805  
   
1,896  
   
1,987  
   
2,078  
   
2,169  
   
2,260  
51 
   
1,432  
   
1,523  
   
1,614  
   
1,705  
   
1,796  
   
1,887  
   
1,978  
   
2,069  
   
2,160  
   
2,251  
52 
   
1,423  
   
1,514  
   
1,605  
   
1,696  
   
1,787  
   
1,878  
   
1,969  
   
2,060  
   
2,151  
   
2,242  …
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
100 
      
991  
   
1,082  
   
1,173  
   
1,264  
   
1,355  
   
1,446  
   
1,537  
   
1,628  
   
1,719  
   
1,810  
101 
      
982  
   
1,073  
   
1,164  
   
1,255  
   
1,346  
   
1,437  
   
1,528  
   
1,619  
   
1,710  
   
1,801  
102 
      
973  
   
1,064  
   
1,155  
   
1,246  
   
1,337  
   
1,428  
   
1,519  
   
1,610  
   
1,701  
   
1,792  …
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
189 
      
190  
      
281  
      
372  
      
463  
      
554  
      
645  
      
736  
      
827  
      
918  
   
1,009  
190 
      
181  
      
272  
      
363  
      
454  
      
545  
      
636  
      
727  
      
818  
      
909  
   
1,000  
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